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ABSTRACT 
 
A Packer to defeat Dynamic Un-packers 
 
Neel Bavishi 
 
This thesis addresses the topic of development and advancement of the Packer 
technology. It aims to prove that with the implementation of advanced code 
encryption and cryptographic techniques in conjunction with standard packing 
methods, testing binaries with anti-virus will become increasingly difficult. 
 
 
 
Study on this topic reveals that the idea of encoding data has already been 
established, but it is still not fully incorporated into a technique to pack an 
executable file. There are some noticeable defects as un-packer tools have also 
made a great advancement in the field of dynamic analysis. The addition of new 
capability to recognize emulation environment and taint analysis has lead to 
execution-time detections of malware. 
 
 
 
The plan is to develop a proof of concept that proves that the dynamic un-packers 
like Renovo can be defeated. The prototype will try to pack and compress the 
binary file in such a way that it can easily evade the emulation environment created 
by anti-viruses. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“PE compression is a way of shrinking a PE file and merging the packed data with 
restoration code into a file” [3]. A Packer is a utility which implements compression 
and some encryption on an executable to make it undetectable by un-packers/virus 
scanners. 
 
Executing a packed executable necessarily un-wraps genuine code and it is then 
handed over the control. It has the same effect as that of running the unaffected PE 
file. The effect it displays is the same as the original executable was running. This 
means that it is impossible for a normal user to differentiate between compressed 
and uncompressed PE files. 
 
A condensed executable is a type of self-extracting archive, wherein packed data is 
wrapped up along with the pertinent restoration routine in a PE file. There are also 
tools  which  only  decompress  an  executable  without  actually  running  it.  For 
example, programs like ZIP and RAR. 
 
Packed files usually decompress directly into the memory without needing any file 
system space to execute. However, some de-compressor stubs write such PE to the 
file system to execute. [3] 
 
Packing a file has its advantages and some disadvantages. We will focus here on 
some of its disadvantages as it is our aim to protect the hidden malware in a binary. 
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PE file compression often dissuades process of reverse engineering. In some cases, 
it might do some obfuscation of the executable contents by using methods shrinking 
and/or added encoding. Executable compression prevents straight disassembly to 
some  extent;  it  masks  the  string  literal  and  alters  the  autographs.  This  never 
suggests that the file cannot be reverse engineered; it is just that the procedure is 
now more expensive. “In addition, it becomes impossible for some utilities to 
recognize  run-time  library  reliance  because  only  the  extractor  stub  which  is 
statically connected is visible.” [3] 
 
Again, certain of age infection scanners mark all compressed PE files as viruses 
leading to false alarms. This is due to similarity in some characteristics to those of 
de-compressor stubs. Most infection scanners usually take out numerous PE 
compression layers to check for the original file inside, but again certain popular 
anti-viruses have problem in piercing through such layers. 
 
Therefore, packers have a big say in PE protection. 
 
 
 
My Packer tool: 
 
 
 
This  thesis  aims  at  creating  such  fully  undetectable  packer  tool  to  protect 
executables from anti-virus scanners as well as debuggers. To provide a complete 
protection to an executable file, this tool has a basic built in flow which goes 
through various cycles of compression and file protection. 
 
 
Executable Input Packer Output Packed Executable 
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As shown in the above diagram, the input to this packer tool is an executable file 
and the output is a packed executable. 
Packer consists of three different stages: 
 
Compression: 
 
Executable data compression is the first stage in packer tool. In this stage, the data 
is compressed and the decompressor stub is packed into the packed executable 
along with the compressed data. This compression happens over two steps as 
follows: 
1.) LZCompress: In this step all the repetitive byte sequences are removed 
 
2.) Huffman Coding: Prefix code is used to compress data 
 
 
 
 
File Protection: 
 
Executable file protection involves many different stages to make it undetectable. 
They include; 
 
1.) Modifying PE File Structure: Adding a new security section 
 
2.) Modify import table values: Mainly related to modifying the Import table 
address 
3.) Static Code redirection: Try to alter flow of a normal program by inserting jump 
statements. 
4.) File Encryption: Simple XOR Encryption for all the sections 
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Anti-Debugging Techniques: 
 
 
There are mainly three anti-debugging techniques used in this tool: 
 
 
1.) Insert lot of junk code 
 
2.) IsDebugger present to detect presence of executable debugger 
 
3.) SoftIce detection: detect presence of SoftIce debugger and disassembler 
 
 
These packer stages will be covered in detail in the following sections. 
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2.  BACKGROUND 
 
 
 
A program can be transformed into a packaged executable using code packing by 
condensing and encoding the original code and data into packed data. This can 
eventually be linked with a restoration routine. A restoration routine is a code 
snippet that can be used for recovering original code and data. Along with this kind 
of recovery, it can also set an execution context to the original code when the 
packed program is executed.[1] 
 
2.1 PE File Structure 
 
PE file format was introduced by Microsoft as a part of Win32 specifications. 
However, they hold their base in earlier used COFF format used on VAX or VMS. 
The term PE which stands for Portable Executable was chosen to intend a common 
file format across all Windows platforms. 
 
 
 
The introduction of 64-bit Windows needed very less modifications in executable 
format. It is thus known as PE-32+.It just required deletion of one field and 
spreading of some fields from 32-bit to 64-bit. In almost all the cases, this code 
works for 32-bit as well as 64-bit systems. “There is magic pixie dust in Windows 
header file. It creates the differences which are not visible to most C++ code base “ 
[9]. 
 
 
 
The EXE and DLL files use the same PE format. The entire distinction between 
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both the types is just of one semantic. The semantic is only a bit which specifies 
whether the file is an EXE or as a DLL. DLL extension is also defined by a user. 
DLLs might have dissimilar extensions. For example, .OCX and .CPL are kinds of 
DLL. [9] 
A standard feature of PE files is the similarity of data structures on disk to those 
used in the memory. They are equal. Therefore, loading a PE file into memory just 
maps some ranges of an executable into the address space. “Thus, a data structure 
like the IMAGE_NT_HEADERS on the disk is similar to that in the memory”. [9] 
 
 
 
PE files structures are mapped into memory as a memory-mapped file with multiple 
units/sections. Windows loader decides what essential sections of the PE file should 
be mapped. This mapping is unswerving in the sense that upper offsets in the file 
should relate to upper memory addresses when they are planted into memory. It is 
not necessary that offset in the item when on the disk, is same as when it is mapped 
into the memory. However, the information needed during transformation from disk 
to memory offset is present. 
 
 
 
Below figure gives the PE structure [9]: 
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Figure 1: PE Structure [9] 
 
 
 
 
Windows loader loads the executable file into the memory. This in-memory version 
of the file is called a module. The beginning address of the module is known as an 
HMODULE. So a point worth noting is that given a HMODULE, you can expect a 
particular data structure at a given address. This information can help to locate 
remaining data structures in the memory. This ability can be exploited for API 
interception as well. [9] 
 
 
 
A module in memory is a representation of all the data, resources and code from a 
portable executable which a process uses. Additional parts of a PE file are possibly 
read for instance and relocations, but not necessarily mapped in. Some parts are not 
planted in at all. For eg, end of the file having debug information.  PE header 
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contains a field which informs the system about the memory required to be put 
aside for mapping the PE file into memory. Unmapped data is appended to the end 
of the file, after mapping required information. 
The PE format is defined in WINNT.H. This header file nearly contains all 
enumerations, definitions; structures and #defines used with PE files in memory. 
 
2.1.1 PE File Sections 
 
A PE file section contains some kind of code or data. Talking about data, they are 
of multiple types  while  code  is  just  code.  Data can  be  of  the type  read/write 
program data in form of global variables. In addition, sections contain data which 
include API import, the exported tables, relocations, resources, etc. Every section 
contains own set of in-memory traits, such as whether it includes some code, it just 
contains read-only or read/write data or the data which is shared by all the processes 
using the portable executable. 
 
 
 
 
In general sense, in a section, all the code/data is somehow related. There are at 
least two sections in a portable executable file. Both code and data occupy each of 
them. Usually, a PE file contains at minimum one more kind of data section. Each 
section of memory has different features which reflect its usage: readable, 
executable, writable and other more specialized operations. 
 
 
 
 
Each section has a unique title/name. This name should express the utility of the 
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section. A section “.rdata” represents a read-only data section. Section names are 
utilized just for human understands, while operating systems have nothing to do 
with it. A section called “.abcd” is also valid just like a “.text” section. Microsoft 
formats  generally  have  a  period  as  a  prefix  to  section  names,  but  it  is  not  a 
necessity. Borland linker names its section as CODE and or DATA. Sections can be 
created and named; it is the linker which includes them in the executable. A VC++ 
compiler inserts code or data into a user named section using #pragma statements. 
For example, the following statement 
 
 
 
inserts all VC++ emitted data into a section called NEW_CODE, and not into the 
 
.data section [9]. Most programs use the default compiler emitted sections, but 
occasionally programmers might have a requirement which requires creating new 
sections to put data in. 
 
The commonly named sections in a PE file are classified as following: 
 
 
.text: Main Code snippet Main responsible for execution and is mostly read-only. 
 
 
.data: Code snippet responsible for main data initialization. 
 
 
.rsrc: Comprises of data associated with Windows Resources. 
 
 
.rdata: Read-only data. 
 
 
.reloc: Base relocations. 
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.debug: Comprises of information responsible for debugging. 
 
 
.idata: Imported function data. 
 
 
.tls: Thread Local Storage. Data private to each thread 
 
 
.CRTData: Set aside for the 'C' Run-Time Library 
 
 
PE explorer can list all the sections from any DLL or EXE file along with numerous other 
attributes that are read from PE File Header. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: PE Explorer results for Putty.exe 
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2.2 How does a packer work? 
 
 
 
Packing an executable means compressing and encrypting it such that for a user it is 
impossible to distinguish between a packed executable and an unpacked executable. 
The packed executable includes packed data as well as the de-compression and 
decrypting routine. 
It works as follows: 
 
Given an arbitrary executable binary, pack the data using compression and 
encryption routine. Check if it the real program code created from the packed data 
in the file is executed. Extract the whole new-generated code and data with its OEP 
(Original Entry Point) address. When the packed PE is executed, its bound 
rebuilding routine performs various alteration actions on the compressed and 
encrypted data to recuperate the original code and data. After the restoration 
completion, the execution context for the original program code to execute is 
prepared.  This  includes  initializing  CPU  registers  and  assigning  the  program 
counter to the entry point of the newly-generated code region [2]. 
 
 
 
2.3 How does a dynamic un-packer work? 
 
 
 
 
The primary motive of a un-packer is to un-wrap the hidden exe and the algorithm 
used to hide it without executing it on a host system. 
It works as follows: 
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Irrespective of packing procedures used or number of coveted layers applied, the 
genuine program and the data available in the memory runs, and in addition the 
instruction pointer  jumps to the original entry point of the re-obtained code which 
was written in the memory at runtime [1]. Using this disadvantage of such 
fundamental nature of packed executable, the un-packer uses a technique that on 
runtime extracts the coveted real code and the original entry point from the wrapped 
up executable by checking if the current instruction is formed at runtime [1]. In this 
approach, the instruction pointer makes a jump to the monitored memory region 
that was written to after the program started. When program loads in the memory, it 
generates a memory map which is initialized as clean. Whenever, a memory write 
operation is performed, for example mov ead,[edx] and push edi, we blot the 
respective  terminus  of  the  memory  location  as  dirty,  meaning  it  is  recently 
generated [1]. Now, the address pointed by the memory pointer is the OEP. 
 
2.4 Dynamic Un-packer example Renovo 
 
 
 
 
 
RENOVO resides on TEMU [13] platform, a dynamic investigation emulation 
software from Bit Blaze. Executable is first executed in an emulation environment. 
This  emulation  isolates  the  extraction  engine  from  the  harmful  program  code. 
Hence, malicious code‟s interference with the extraction engine is difficult and does 
not affect analysis of the results. For our analysis, we need to know which processes 
should be observed.   TEMU provides mechanism to reason about this OS-level 
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semantics. Theoretically, a kernel module is inserted into the emulated environment 
to obtain necessary process data. Hence, the module will be notified whenever a 
process is created or destroyed, or a module (.dll or .exe) is loaded into the process. 
In 32-bit systems, the physical address of the page table for the current process is 
stored  in  CR3  register  which  makes  it  unique  for  each  process  [1].  After  the 
program starts to execute, identifying the loaded module leads to knowledge of 
memory region it occupies and the states within the region are cleaned. To know 
whether program has a hidden executable a timeout mechanism is executed. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Working of a packed Executable [1] 
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When checking newly generated instructions, every instruction is not checked. For 
performance, optimization, every fundamental block in the monitored process is 
verified. A fundamental block is defined as sequential instructions with a unique 
entry and exit. Thus, a fundamental block is nothing but a neighboring code region. 
The address is recorded at the entry of the block. Eventually, at the exit of the 
block, memory locations, which are marked as dirty within the region covering this 
block, are verified whether they exist or not. If they exist then this block entry is the 
unique point of entry and the pages with dirty memory bytes are dumped. 
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3.  PREVIOUSLY USED TECHNIQUES TO EVADE DYNAMIC UN- 
PACKERS 
 
 
 
 
Various techniques are proposed to evade dynamic analysis by un-packers: 
Important among those are explained as follows: 
 
3.1 Circumventing the emulated environment 
 
 
 
 
As the binaries are executed in emulated environment in un-packer, one obvious 
evasion technique that comes to mind is to detect the presence of emulated 
environment  and  stay  inactive.  The  malicious  code  measures  time  elapsed  for 
certain instructions, as the emulation of such instructions incurs high overhead. This 
code may also verify the instructions results such as sidt, because they produce 
diverse results under physical and emulated environments. This can be shown by 
performing the RedPill test as shown below. 
 
 
 
 
3.1.1    Red Pill Test 
 
 
 
Red Pill test [6] discovered by Joanna Rutkowska in Nov 2004, is a way to detect 
VMM (Virtual Machine Manager) using a processor instruction. “The important 
part of this test is the SIDT instruction which contains the contents of the IDTR in 
the destination operand. This operand represents memory location. The interesting 
characteristic of SIDT instruction is that though it is executed in the user mode, the 
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contents of the IDTR are returned. IDTR is used internally by operating system”. 
[6] 
 
On any system, there is only one IDT register, but there could be multiple OS 
running concurrently, like guest and host. Therefore, the guest's IDTR should be 
relocated in a safe place by VMM (Virtual Memory Manager) to keep it safe from 
host one. Unfortunately, it is not possible for VMM to know when the process 
running in guest OS executes SIDT instruction because of its limited privileges. 
Thus,  the relocated  address  of  IDT is  obtained  by the process.  The relocation 
address of IDT on VMWare is detected as 0xffXXXXXX, whereas on Virtual PC it is 
0xe8XXXXXX [4]. 
 
 
Short background on SIDT: 
 
 
SIDT stands for “Store Interrupt Descriptor Table Register”. Its Opcode is 0F 01/1. 
 
 
General use: SIDT m -> Store IDTR to m. 
 
 
“The destination operand indicates a 6-byte memory location. If the operand-size 
attribute is 32 bits, the 16-bit limit field of the register is stored in the lower 2 bytes 
of the memory location and the 32-bit base address is stored in the upper 4 bytes. If 
the operand-size attribute is 16 bits, the limit is stored in the lower 2 bytes and the 
24-bit base address is stored in the third, fourth, and fifth byte, with the sixth byte 
filled with 0s.” [19] 
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Code Section 1: Small Red Pill test code snippet 
 
 
 
 
 
Host with no VMM: Not in Matrix. (Not in VM) 
 
 
Host with VMM, but no VMM is running: Not in VM 
 
 
Host with VMM, VMM running: In VM (Supposedly in a VM) 
Guest in the above host: In VM. 
Flaw: This test is inadequate because, in multicore CPUs the process execution 
takes place in different processors every time. The main problem caused is that 
every time the IDT address will change, same problem will be faced while checking 
LDT and GDT tables. 
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3.1.2    Determine the Host Specific process 
 
 
 
For example, vmsrvc for Virtual Private Client from Microsoft is a process which 
runs when we can identify while running our application in VPC. Similarly, there is 
a process called VBox Service for Virtual Box from Sun. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Code Section 2: Determine host specific process 
 
 
 
 
Flaw: The software emulators like QEMU being a full system emulator; it is 
difficult to identify any such processes being executed to identify the execution 
unit. 
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3.1.3    Read Bios information 
 
 
 
This technique was used by a security group in a company named Sysinternals 
which was later brought by Microsoft. This is one of the easiest and most effective 
techniques used to identify whether a binary is executing in an emulated 
environment. If it is executed in a virtual machine, it will give an error and stop 
executing. 
 
 
 
Code Section 3: Obtain System information 
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The above code snippet runs correctly on real system. It prints the hardware 
information that is read from RMBIOS by making system calls. Basically, it copies 
hardware information into system_info structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Output for program to get the system information 
 
 
 
Now, when the exe is executed in an emulated environment like QEMU or VPC it 
gives an error straight away as no hardware information can be obtained. The error 
is as shown below: 
23 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Error caused while running executable under virtual environment 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2   Exploiting the time-out 
 
Time-out   [4]   is   an   interesting   problem   discussed   in   Security   Application 
Conference in Washington DC, in 2006. As we know, determining whether a PE 
contains hidden code or not is an un-decidable problem, for which a time-out 
mechanism is usually employed. The malicious programs use this technique 
regularly to exploit such feature to remain inactive for long period leading to 
incorrect results by the un-packer. To counter this exploitation, un-packers use an 
improved metric which determines the termination of the extraction procedure by 
counting the number of different instructions from the binary that execute. This 
means that these malicious codes cannot avoid detection by merely looping around. 
[1] 
 
 
 
 
3.3    Dual Mapping Physical Pages 
 
Another approach is dual-mapping. [5] This approach was first used by H Miller.” 
According  to  this  approach,  physical  pages  are  mapped  to  two  distinct  virtual 
address regions. The first region is provided for editable mapping to write during 
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unpacking process whereas the second region is provided for executable mapping 
which dynamically executes the unpacked code. Thus, this approach is effective in 
evading automated un-packers, which solely depend on perceiving the virtual 
addresses code execution that it has been written to.” [5] 
 
 
4.  PROJECT OVERVIEW 
 
 
 
The aim of this thesis project is to make a tool which protects the executable or PE 
in question from being recognized by anti-virus scanners as threats. Fig 6 gives the 
block diagram of this tool. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Packer Block Diagram 
 
 
This tool accepts a PE (portable executable) file as input. In the packer, it goes through 
various transformations as shown in the block diagram to output a packed executable. 
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4.1 Packer stages 
 
 
 
 
Packer has 3 built in stages in form of compression, file protection and anti-debugging. 
 
 
 
 
Compression: 
 
 
This tool has two built in compressor which have base in open source LZIB compression 
library: 
 
1.)  LZCompress: LZCompress is a lossless type of data compression. It is most effective 
when there are repetitions in byte sequences. It has its base in LZ77 algorithm from 
Lempel Ziv algorithms family. In this type of compression algorithm, there are two types of 
buffer, one which contains processed bytes, u-buffer and other which contains bytes to 
processed, v-buffer. While filling in the v-buffer we check for the similar byte sequences in 
u-buffer. If a sequence is obtained, we save the location in the v-buffer instead of holding 
the entire buffer content. This helps to reduce a lot of size. It is explained in detail in next 
section. 
 
 
 
2.)  Huffman Coding: It is a form of prefix code. Each value is represented by a sequences 
of codes, either 0 or 1. The values which are repeated frequently, for example vowels in a 
sentence, are given shorter codes. This again reduces the executable file size. Its 
implementation is covered in the next section. 
 
File Protection: 
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File protection is a very important stage of this packer tool. An executable/PE file goes 
through various Static protection procedures and dynamic redirection process to prevent 
against reverse engineering. Some of them can be listed as follows: 
 
1.)  Modify PE File Structure 
 
2.)  Static Code Redirection 
 
3.)  PE File Encryption 
 
4.)  Modify Import Table 
 
5.)  Dynamic Code redirection 
 
 
Anti-Debugging Techniques: 
 
 
In this tool there three main anti-debugging techniques used 
 
 
1.) Insertion of Junk Code 
 
2.) Is-Debugger present 
 
3.) SoftIce detection 
 
 
Apart from this, static code redirection and dynamic code direction causes lot of 
problems in code debugging due to changes in normal execution routines. 
 
This part is covered in detail in Section 6. 
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5.  COMPRESSION TECHNIQUE USED 
 
 
 
 
Data compression is an important stage of this packer tool. Compression is possible due to 
redundancy in data. It is basically the technique to encode data such that it requires less 
storage space or transmission time than it would take without being compressed. 
 
There are mainly 2 types of data compression techniques: 
 
 
1. Lossless Compression: Used in spreadsheets, text, executable program Compression. 
 
 
2. Lossy less Compression: Compression of images, movies and sounds. 
As, this tool is about executable compression, it uses Lossless Compression. 
In this tool two different types of compression techniques are used.  One is the variant of 
Lempel Ziv Algorithms family [18] and other uses Huffman coding [17]. They have their 
roots in the two algorithms proposed by Jacob Ziv and Abraham Lempel. These 
Compression algorithms are mainly divided in two main groups: LZ77 and LZ78 [16]. The 
clear difference between the two groups is that LZ77 do not need an explicit dictionary 
where LZ78 does need it. 
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Figure 7: Lempel-Ziv family of Algorithms [7] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There are two compressors built in this tool. They are executed one after the other. 
The two of them are: 
1.   LZ Compress 
 
 
2.   Huffman Coding 
 
 
Small executable files go through only one step where as larger ones need the 
execution of second step. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 LZ Compress: 
 
In LZ Compression algorithm, the program stores W previous bytes and scans the next few 
bytes such that they are repetition of the previous stored data. In case of the match found, 
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then the length of bits and location are recorded and stored. This requires fewer bytes and 
hence less amount of memory space which leads to compression. [14] 
 
 
 
 
This algorithm uses two buffers. First buffer provides encoded strings that were 
previously  encoded.  This  “previously  encoded  buffer"  is  denoted  as  “u”.  The 
second buffer provides the “to be compressed” strings. This “to be encoded buffer" 
is denoted as “v”. Last symbol in the v- buffer is excluded because an extension 
symbol should always be kept un-encoded. 
 
 
Figure 8: Buffers used in LZ Compression Algorithm [11] 
 
 
 
 
Flowchart (Fig.11) shows the vital parts of this algorithm. In the beginniing, the u- 
buffer  is  initialized  with  a  value.  Now,  v-buffer  is  parsed  to  find  the  longest 
possible match. During the first iteration, unless the string in contention to be 
condensed starts with spaces, the parser cannot search a match. 
 
 
 
A code word of the form <p,|u|,q> is formed.  p indicates the position from where 
the match starts in the u-buffer, and |u| is the extension character. The extension 
character q is the subsequent character read in this string and has to be encrypted 
after if finds a match. Sometimes, the matches can reach into the v-buffer. 
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Suppose a String for compression: 
 
“Fair is foul, and foul is fair: Hover through the fog and filthy air." [11] 
E.g. assuming the u-buffer already contains: 
 
 
Figure 9: Contents of u-buffer [11] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
And the v-buffer contains: 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Contents of v-buffer [11] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Contents of u- and v-Buffer during Compression [11] 
Algorithm: 
 
Basic Algorithm for LZ Compress for the above example is as follows: 
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Step1: Parse the buffer to find the longest match  the next coming character is n 
which does not appear in the u-buffer. 
Step2: This makes code word to be < 0, 0, n>, n being the next incoming character 
scanned. 
Step3: Now, shift the u-buffer and v-buffer by 1 character as shown in the table. 
Step4: Parse the buffer to find the longest match  the next coming character is d 
which does not appear in the u-buffer. 
Step5: This makes code word to be < 0, 0, d>, d being the next incoming character 
scanned. 
Step6: Again, shift the u-buffer and v-buffer by 1 character as shown in the table. 
Step7: While the third iteration executes, the lengthiest match is detected in form of 
the string “foul”. 
Step8: Hence, the code word obtained is <6, 4, t >. 
 
Step9: Both u- and v- buffers are moved by 5 characters towards left, that is length 
of the string foul and the extension characters. 
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Figure 11: Flowchart of LZCompress 
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In this algorithm, the input bytes are stored in an array. The bytes processed already 
are stored from a[0] to a[Q-1] i.e our u-buffer and the bytes that are to be processed 
are stored from a[Q] to a[Q+U-1] which is same as stored in b[0] to b[U-1] i.e. our 
v-buffer.  Therefore, the bytes in b[0], b[1], b[2] . . b[U-1] are compared with 
previous bytes to find a match. 
 
 
 
Code Section 4: Implementation of LZ Compress 
 
 
 
 
In this program, “a[]” stores the latest 4096 processed bytes read from the file in question 
and plus 16 unprocessed bytes. The 16 unprocessed bytes are referred to as “b[]” in the 
above program segment. The algorithm tries to find a copy of bytes in array b starting 
from b[0] to as many as possible bytes in previously processed data a[]. If at least two 
matching bytes are found, then “s” indicates the number of bytes matched and “r’ gives 
the position for match occurrence in a[] so that, the first byte matched is a[r]. If no match 
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is found, at least b[0] and b[1] are tied together in a[], s and m are set to the value of 1 
and b[0] respectively, which indicates an input character. [14] 
 
 
 
 
 
Find function that tries to find actual match: 
 
 
 
Code Section 5: Implementation of find the match function 
 
 
 
 
The actual searching happens in the find function. The for loop "for(i = 0; i<Q; 
i++). . ." initializes the search process in each position in the processed data. The 
actual comparison happens in the statement "for(p = 0; p<m && a[p+i]==b[p]; 
p++);" This loop just repeats until the end of where the match is found in the two 
arrays that are in contention. On completion, “p” indicates the number of places that 
match and “i” gives the location of the match. If the match found is longer than the 
best one found before, p and i are taken as the new values of s and r. At the end of 
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for loop, the length and location of the longest match in s and r respectively are 
obtained. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Huffman coding 
 
 
 
Huffman coding [17] discovered by Ken Huffman, is a form of prefix coding, 
which is knowingly or unknowingly are used in common. One example of prefix 
coding used in phone is Huffman coding. The order of keys pressed may be a 
sequence of any key number combination -- and each order pressed represents a 
different definite phone number. 
 
Suppose that you are in a workplace environment with all the employees having 
their allotted phone numbers in the office. For internal communication in most of 
the companies you don‟t need to dial full number. It is just last four digits and a 
prefix digit „9‟. This digit is known as the prefix digit in Huffman coding. Each 
element specified has a unique code created by numbers, and because each name 
begins with a unique code, there will be no ambiguity that each code when you 
enter will be exactly what you wanted.  [12] 
 
A Huffman code is a form of prefix code dealing with bits. Here, codes are made up 
of a sequence of bits that may be 0 or 1 in place of a series of decimal numbers 
from 0 to 9. Each code represents a series of alphabets. This is the main use of 
Huffman coding in Deflation algorithm. 
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In Huffman algorithm, firstly all the alphabets are assembled. Each alphabet is then 
assigned a “weight” – Weight is the frequency of letters in the data to be packed. 
Such weights may be decided earlier, or stated from parsing the data, or some 
permutation-combination of both. Two elements are chosen at a time in any case 
and the one with minimum weight is selected first. The two elements are made to be 
leaf nodes of a node with two branches. Let us see an example with weights given 
as below: 
 
 
 
 
 
D and E are picked first as they have lowest weight. A node is branched into these 
two elements -- one being the `0' branch and the other being `1'. 
 
 
 
 
 
In this situation, complete code for any element cannot be known, but it is at least 
clear that D and E have equal codes, other than the last binary digit where D ends in 
0 whereas E in 1. 
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The joined node D-and-E is positioned back into the pool of elements which are not 
combined, with the weight obtained from the sum of its leaf nodes: for example, 8 + 
8 = 16 in this case. Now, the two nodes with lowest weight taken are A, and D-and- 
E combined, and they form a large node. 
 
 
 
 
 
Again, the node A-D-E is re-added to the original set of elements. But this time 
around, all outstanding elements have the same value of 32. So there is confusion in 
which two to select first for the combination. But it is actually not important in 
Huffman algorithm. 
 
Finally we get a complete Huffman tree wherein we can reach any element from 
root selecting proper 0 or 1 branch. Thus, each element traversal can be done with 
the order of 0's and 1's. This is known as Huffman code for those elements, that 
symbolizes the pathway through the tree. 
 
Now, it can be visualized that such a tree, and mere a set of codes, provide a way 
for executable compression. During compression of ordinary text, probably 50% of 
the ASCII characters could be omitted from the tree completely. Commonly utilized 
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characters, like all the vowels or some letters like “T” will perhaps get quite smaller 
codes and the long codes will be used the least. 
 
It is also fairly simple to pass encrypted data along with the tree and can be coded 
by slightly altering the algorithm which generates the tree. 
 
So how is Deflate different from class Huffman coding? In the case of classic, 
multiple  trees  could  be  generated  using  a  single  set  of  elements  and  weights, 
whereas the Deflate variation uses two supplementary rules: elements with the 
shorter codes are positioned on the left side and the longer codes on right side. If 
codes have the same length, then the first in the element set are positioned on the 
left. 
 
Thus, if these two restrictions are applied on the trees, there is a unique tree 
generated for every set of elements and their respective code lengths. These code 
lengths will help in reconstruction of the tree. 
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void En_Decode::BuildHufTree() 
{ 
int NodeCounter =   256; 
int i; 
 
for (i =  O; i <  NodeCounter; i++) 
{ 
OurTree[i].parent =  -1; 
OurTree[i].right = -1; 
OurTree[i].left = -1; 
 
 
while (1) 
 
int MinFreqO  -1; 
int MinFreql  -1; 
 
for (i =  0; i <  NodeCounter;  i++) 
{ 
if (i != MinFreqO) 
{ 
if (OurTree[i].freq > 0 && OUrTree[i].parent -1) 
{ 
if (MinFreqO == -1 11  OurTree[i].freq < 
OurTree[MinFreqO].freq) 
{ 
 
OurTree[MinFreq1].freq) 
 
 
} 
if (MinFreq1 == -1 1  1     OurTree[i].freq < 
 
MinFreq1 MinFreqO; 
MinFreqO =  i; 
else if (MinFreq1 
OurTree[MinFreq1].freq) 
-1 1  1     OurTree[i].freq < 
MinFreql =  i; 
 
 
} 
if (MinFreq1 == -1) 
{ 
NumOfRootNode 
break; 
} 
MinFreqO; 
 
//Combine  two nodes to form a parent node 
OurTree[MinFreqO].parent =  NodeCounter; 
OurTree[MinFreql].parent =  NodeCounter; 
OurTree[NodeCounter].freq = OurTree[MinFreqO].freq + 
OurTree[MinFreq1].freq; 
OurTree[NodeCounter].r ight =  MinFreqO; 
OurTree[NodeCounter].left = 
MinFreq1; OurTree[NodeCounter].parent 
=  -1; NodeCounter++; 
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Code Section 6: Huffman Coding build tree function 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Generic Compressor Class: 
 
 
 
Code Section 7: Our main Compressor Class 
 
 
 
The exe compression process goes through both the Compression Strategies and the 
resulting exe is the obtained which has the minimum size. 
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Code Section 8: Go through all compressors 
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6.  PE File Protection: 
 
 
 
 
PE file protection has been implemented in the following ways in this thesis project. 
 
 
6.1   Altering Executable structure: 
 
 
 
In an executable, the PE header contains information describing the assets and general 
features. During the step of PE file protection; this PE header information is modified. The 
change mainly includes number of sections, Origin Point Address, Image Size and data‟s 
real virtual addresses and their magnitudes. 
 
Addition of a novel section to the executable with the security stuff is a common method 
used in packing process. This extra added section is carries the essential knowledge to be 
used for the un-wrapping process. This might include the actual executable file headers and 
assemblies detached or changed during procedure for putting in the security. Following fig. 
describes how such protected PE file is structured. 
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Figure 12: Adding new section 
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Code Section 9: Insert new section in a PE file 
 
 
 
 
6.2   Modifying Import Table: 
 
 
 
This is mainly done by altering the table containing Import Addresses (IAT). It mainly 
delivers information about the DLL imports and its purposes, which is used by the 
executable during runtime. The security is implemented by altering the address of Import 
table  as  well  as  changing  the  structure  of  table  itself.  The  newly  generated  table  is 
dependent upon the un-wrapping DLL. This un-wrapping DLL along with some code from 
the added protective section performs the un-wrapping operation. 
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6.3   Static Code Rerouting: 
 
 
 
This rerouting procedure is a significant step towards a completely secure PE file. This 
method aims to reroute some JMP or CALL statements in the actual executable code 
towards the IJT which is contingent on the un-wrapping DLL. The static code redirection 
processes includes stripping the executable code, then choosing some JMP or CALL 
statements and then modify their aimed localities to matching IJT entry [15]. The un- 
wrapping DLL is used to reload the apt Interception Jump Table Entry code snippet so that 
the execution flow is redirected towards the original location. 
 
Following code illustrates the code used for rerouting procedure in every IJT entry. 
 
 
 
 
 
Code Section 10: code snippet for rerouting procedure in every IJT entry 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4   File Encryption: 
 
 
 
This procedure should encode some parts of the executable file so that static or dynamic 
disassembling and code reverse engineering can be prevented. The defense procedure will 
encode the code sections, data directories, actual IAT and IJT and bury the key anywhere in 
47 
 
 
the executable, or the key is derived from certain sections of the executable using some 
mathematical calculations/algorithms. Adding several progressions of security on the 
executable file defies reverse engineering automation and makes it difficult for the 
disassembling software to strip the secured code. Encoding of the code is done primarily 
putting untrue algorithm stream in case of direct disassembly. The encoding of IJT makes 
the process of reversing the executable difficult as the procedure should be dynamic now. 
 
 
 
 
Code Section 11: Simple Encryption for all the sections 
 
 
 
 
 
6.5   Anti-Debug Methods: 
 
 
 
1.)  IsDebuggerPresent Windows Api: It will return none zero value whenever the current 
process is running in the context of a debugger. 
 
2.)  SoftIce Detection: 
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Code Section 12: SoftIce detection 
 
 
 
 
 
3.) Insert Junk Code: 
 
 
In this anti-debug technique, the tool inserts lot of junk code such that even if the PE file is 
opened in some unknown debugger, junk code will make sure that the reverse engineering 
gets frustrating. 
 
6.6   Dynamic Code redirection: 
 
 
 
We have seen Static code rerouting before. It is nice way to protect an exe file. The 
problem with it is that we need to keep attached un-packer dll at all times. This creates lot 
of overhead for the PE file and degrades its performance. To prevent this degrade, we 
implement Dynamic Code Redirection. 
 
The Dynamic Code Redirection should offer an algorithm that, by some means, reduces the 
execution overhead without affecting the security of the PE file. This redirection should 
treat every IJT Entry as a separate unit and observe the amount of implementations of every 
unit. During the same interval, it should monitor the global amount of implementations of 
49 
 
 
all the units in the run time. These counters will act as a key component  of the algorithm in 
balancing swiftness, performance efficiency and protection of the application. [15] 
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7.  TESTS 
 
As a test example, an executable binder.exe is taken. It is checked on a website known as 
www.virustotal.com, where in there are about 41 different anti-viruses who check your 
 
file. 
 
 
Out of those 41, 38 of the viruses detect the existing threat. 
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Now, the file is zipped in a .rar format and again the test is done on Binder.rar. The results 
show that 32/41 anti –viruses are still able to detect the threat. 
 
 
 
 
Finally, the file is packed by the proposed Binder and it goes through encryption stage as 
shown below. 
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Results obtained when the file is checked on  www.virustotal.com are quite positive this 
 
time around. Only 16/41 anti-virus tools are able to catch the existing threat. The results 
are shown below. 
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8.  CONCLUSION: 
 
 
 
The technology to pack a portable executable file has gone through efficient and 
rich   development   through   the   use   of   various   code   packing   cryptographic 
approaches. However, it is important to realize the progress made by un-packers too 
which render most of the current means incompetent. Multi core processors and 
dynamic analysis have made unpacking very effective and powerful. Hence, it is 
important to realize the integration of new encryption and compression methods to 
the current equipment. This thesis proposes a new system for greatly improving the 
packers. If the processed executable file is able to cut out some import information, 
implement dynamic redirection while debugging or implement the time-out 
mechanism,  it  will  be  possible  to  break  any  kind  of  dynamic  scrutiny.  This 
technique differs from the original packing process in that it doesn‟t measure the 
emulation. This thesis will provide a way to integrate a new approach to compress 
and encrypt with the currently used technology. 
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